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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York Lithographers and Photo
Engravers' Union, Local IP, GAIU
AFL-CIO

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co.

The stipulated issue is:
Is Jirair Kalenderian entitled to holiday
pay under the collective bargaining agreement for Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays, 1976?
A hearing was held on July 27, 1976 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Publisher appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties waived

the contractual tripartite Board of Arbitration, agreeing instead
to submit the dispute to the Undersigned as the sole arbitrator.
The Arbitrator's Oath was also waived.
The essential facts are undisputed.

Mr. Kalenderian, a

regular situation holder, and hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," was ill and did not work from May 31, 1975 through
February 29, 1976.

During that period the contract holidays of

Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays fell, as did other contract
holidays.

Conceding that the grievant was not

contractually

entitled to holiday pay for any of the other holidays the Union
contends he is entitled to holiday pay for Lincoln's birthday
and Washington's birthday for the year 1976 under Section
of the contract.

Said Section reads:

12(d)

-2(d) However, no provision of this section
shall deny to a regular situation holder who
does not work on Lincoln's Birthday or
Washington's Birthday, a single shift's pay
at straight time rates provided his job is
covered by a substitute. Said substitute, who
shall receive no less than two (2) days pay for
the shift worked, may work in accordance with
the hours provision of Section 2.
There is no dispute that the grievant's job was "covered by a
substitute" within the meaning of the foregoing contract provision.
The Company asserts that Section 12(d) upon which the Union
relies is only supplemental to and conditioned upon other provisions of Section 12 specifically Sections 12(b) and 12(c).

It

argues that the payment of holiday pay when an employee is ill or
disabled is fully covered by those two sections and that Section
12(d) is applicable to circumstances other than when an employee
is out ill or disabled.

Put another way it is the Company's

position that 12(d) does not cover the absence of an employee on
Lincoln's birthday or Washington's birthday due to illness or
disability but rather, presumably to absences on those days for
other reasons; and that Sections 12(b) and 12(c) are fully dispositive of an employee's right to any holiday pay when ill or disabled.
Sections 12(b) and 12(c) read in pertinent part:
(b) A regular situation holder who has
worked at least once in the fiscal week in
which a holiday occurs shall receive a single
shift's pay at straight-time rates under the
following conditions:
(c) When a regular, full-time employee covered
by this Agreement is absent because of illness or
accident subject to the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Law, including the Disability Benefits
Law, and when a holiday falls within the first 90

-3days of that period of absence, that employee
will receive a single shift's pay for the holiday in addition to the compensation or disability
payment required by Law.
Based on the foregoing argument, the Publisher asserts that
the grievant is not entitled to holiday pay for Lincoln's birthday and Washington's birthday during the year 1976 because those
holidays did not fall within the first ninety days of the
grievant's absence, as required by Section 12(c).
Moreover the Publisher contends that to grant the Union's
grievance would produce an unreasonable and unintended result.
It would mean the Publisher points out that an employee who was
ill or disabled for an extended period of time, including a period
of years, would continue to be paid each year for Lincoln's birthday and Washington's birthday despite the fact that he had not
worked at all for that extended period of time.
The Publisher's argument that Section 12(d) is supplemental
to, restricted by or conditioned on Sections 12(b) and 12(c) is
rebutted by the clear and unconditional introductory language of
Section 12(d).

That language reads:

"However, no provision of this section shall
deny to a regular situation holder...."(emphasis added)
Obviously the phrase "no provision of this section" means, that
Section 12(d) stands alone irrespective of and unrestricted by any
of the other provisions of Section 12.

It follows therefore that

Section 12(d) cannot be interpreted as merely supplemental to or
conditioned on Section 12(c).

Therefore a regular situation

-4holder is entitled to holiday pay for Lincoln's birthday and
Washington's birthday if he does not work on those days even if
his absence is due to illness or disability.

In other words,

Sections 12(b) and 12(c) are not the only Sections which cover
the question of holiday pay when an employee is absent because
of illness or disability.

Rather Section 12(d) accords holiday

pay for Lincoln's birthday and Washington's birthday apart from
and irrespective of the application of any other provision of
Section 12.

Moreover Section 12(d) does not place a limitation

on the reasons for an employee's absence on the two holidays in
question.

Instead it guarantees pay for those two days with only

two provisos; first that the employee be a regular situation
holder and second that his job be covered by a substitute.

The

grievant, and his absence in the instant case, meet those
requirements.
With regard to the Publisher's claim that to grant the
grievance is to create an unreasonable or inequitable interpretation of the contract, the answer is that such interpretation
by this Arbitrator is merely a reflection of the contract bargain
entered into by the parties when they negotiated Section 12(d),
with its introductory language.

Hence, if an unreasonable or

inequitable result is produced thereby it must be changed by
collective bargaining not arbitration.

In this regard it should

be noted that Counsel for the Union gratuitously observed that
it might well be unfair and unreasonable to grant an employee
pay for Lincoln's birthday and Washington's birthday a second

-5-

consecutive year, when his illness or disability kept him out
of work that amount of time.

Absent a negotiated change, I

would agree with his stated "rule of reason."
Accordingly the Undersigned, having been duly appointed
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
Jirair Kalenderian is entitled under the
collective bargaining agreement to holiday pay for Lincoln's birthday and Washington's
birthday, 1976.

Eric J. Schmertz

DATED: August 26, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
On this twenty-sixth day of August, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Federation of College Teachers
Local 1460, AFT

AWARD
Case #1330 1214 75

and
Long Island University (The Brooklyn
Center)

During the hearing of the above matter on February 11, 1976
the parties reached an agreement for the present disposition of
this case.

At their request I make that agreement a CONSENT

AWARD, as follows:
Without deciding the merits of the Markovich
grievance in case #1330 1214 75, and without
prejudice to the positions of both sides in
that matter, the parties agree that prospectively from the date of this AWARD:
1. The parties agree and recognize that Article
18 of the collective bargaining agreement dated
September 1, 1974 and past practices shall determine the proper formulation of teaching schedules.
2. The Undersigned retains jurisdiction for the
application and implementation of this AWARD,
relating to future teaching schedules of
Dr. Michael Markovich.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 17, 1976
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
On this seventeenth day of February, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 1251 UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0018 76

and
Lux Time Division
Roberstshaw Controls Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the grievant, Richard Weeks, improperly
denied the job of Progressive Tool Setter
Operator under the provisions of the labor
agreement, and if so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Waterbury, Connecticut on May 26,
1976 at which time the grievant and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared.

All were afforded full opportun

ity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Company filed a post hearing brief.

The grievant is a Lead Person in the Powdered Metals
Department.

In late 1975 he was denied a bid to the job set

forth in the stipulated issue.

He was the only bidder.

Had his

bid been granted the move from one job to the other would have
been lateral, within labor grade 13, but between two different
departments.

The relevant contract provision is Article VI

Section 13, the pertinent parts of which read:
1. When a new job is created or a permanent
vacancy occurs within the Bargaining Unit a
notice concerning the job shall be posed for
a period of two working days on the time clocks.
After this time, no further request will be
accepted for such vacancy and no grievance
alleging that seniority has been violated shall

-2be considered if the employee has not made
application within the specified time. The
Union Chairman and Department Steward will
be given a copy of each posting.
3. The filling of the vacancy will be carried
out on a seniority basis from the eligible
applicants having the necessary skill and
ability to do the required work.
The Company denied the grievant's bid on the grounds that
he lacked the "skill and ability to do the required work."

The

Company contends that the grievant's job of Lead Person in the
Powdered Metals Department (Department 42) is not relevant, in
terms of experience and duties, to the job of High Speed
Progressive Tool Setter in the Press Department (Department 27);
that the contract does not require the Company to train a bidder
in the job he seeks; and that the production needs of the Company
required that the job be filled by an employee who could perform
the duties without extensive training.
The Union asserts that the grievant possesses the requisite
skill and ability, primarily because of his experience in the
Powdered Metals Department; that he could have performed the job
after a short break-in period; and that alternatively, based on
practice, the Company should have afforded him a reasonable train
ing period to learn the job as needed.
I find that I need not resolve the foregoing disputed
contentions because, based on the particular facts in this case,
I conclude that the grievant, by his own act, waived his right
to the job he sought.
It is well settled that an employer may utilize a test or

-3some testing method as a factor in determining an employee's
skill and ability, provided the test is relevant to the job in
question and further provided that it is uniformly and nondiscriminatorily administered to the bidders.

In the instant

case the Company gave the grievant a trial set-up as a test to
determine his ability, skill and familiarization with the duties
of the job he sought.
requirements.

This trial set-up met the foregoing

The grievant had never before performed the job

in question; the Company questioned his ability to do so; the set
up which he was asked to make was representative of some of the
less complicated set-ups he would be required to perform; and
he was accorded a sufficient amount of time to complete it.
Under those circumstances I conclude that both the Company's
requirement that he undergo a test in the form of a trial set-up
and the content and scope of that test were reasonable and
appropriate.
The grievant did not complete the trial set-up to the
Company's satisfaction.

The Company then offered him a second

opportunity to perform a trial set-up, with the Union time study
representative

in attendance.

By doing so the Company obviously

had not yet excluded the grievant from consideration.

Had the

grievant done so successfully he might have established his
qualifications for the job without question.

Had he attempted

the second set-up and again failed in the Company's estimate,
he, and the Union on his behalf, still had the right to grieve
the Company's decision to reject his bid.

But the grievant

-4declined to accept the second opportunity.
the second trial set-up.

He refused to attempt

Considering the propriety of that test

as previously indicated, and considering the grievant's unsatisfactory or at best inconclusive performance in the first trial
set-up, I deem his refusal to do a second trial set-up as a de
facto or constructive abandonment of his job bid.

With his

refusal to comply with the Company's request that he perform a
second trial set-up, a reasonable threshhold condition in
evaluating ability and skill, he waived any right he had to
further consideration for appointment to the job, and lost his
right to complain when and how thereafter the job was assigned
to someone else.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly

designated as the

Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Richard Weeks was not improperly denied the
job of Progressive Tool Setter Operator
under the provisions of the labor agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 7, 1976
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of September, 1976, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In The Matter of The Disciplinary
Proceeding
between
Transit Supervisors Benevolent
Association On Behalf of Michael McGrath
and
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit
Operating Authority

This proceeding is an appeal under Article 6 Paragraph 2-b
of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties to review the Recommendation below that Michael McGrath
be suspended for ten (10) working days without pay for improper
performance of duty.
The hearing was held on April 26, 1976 at which time
Mr. McGrath, hereinafter referred to as the ngrievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evicl nee
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The charge against
the grievant as set forth in the
.
of Charges dated July 8 5 1975 is:
You are charged with the improper performance
of your duties in failing to require Foreman
R. Johnson to maintain proper records and
controls. The proper performance of your
duties would have prevented the occurrences
set forth in the charges addressed to Foreman
Johnson and Body Maintainer Ryan....
The "occurrences" referred to aforementioned was the.
theft of a farebox or the money therein from a bus by Ryar .
Ryan was discharged. Johnson, who was Ryan's direct supervisor
was discharged but was reinstated without back pay by

-2Arbitrator Theodore W. Kheel.

The grievant who was Johnson's

immediate superior is appealing a ten day suspension in the
instant proceeding.

Mr. Nicholas Canosa an Assistant

Superin-

tendent and the Depot Administrator, who was the grievant's
superior was suspended ten days without pay.

He is not repre-

sented by an employee organization, and did not appeal.
The Employer's action against the grievant is based on its
policy of requiring accountability from supervising employees
for poor performance, misconduct or other failings of other
employees under their direct or indirect supervision.
with Mr. Kheel that this is a commendable policy.

I agree

However, as

I have stated in Trial Board recommendations, I do no.t believe
it means that a supervisory employee is an "absolute

guarantor"

of the proper conduct, good performance and efficiency of all
those whom he supervises.

Rather some proximate or causal

1

relationship must be shown between what the supervisory employee
did or failed to do as part of his duties and the improper act,
unsatisfactory performance or other unsatisfactory condition
attributed to or engaged in by an employee whom he supervises.
In the instant case the Employer has not established
anything that the grievant did or failed to do as the .cause,
either directly or indirectly of the theft of the farebox by
Ryan.

Based on the evidence and particularly the testimony of

•
the Depot Administrator, the "records and controls" which the
grievant allegedly failed to properly maintain had nothing whatsoever to do with the theft of the farebox.

Based on the record

o
-J-

it cannot be concluded, as a logical or reasonable possibility,
that the farebox would not have been stolen had those records
and controls been properly maintained.
The Employer's case in this regard is argument and at
best speculative.

It asserts that the grievant's failure to
.

maintain proper records and controls or to see to it that
Foreman Johnson did so "created an atmosphere" which tempted
Ryan to commit the theft.
this proposition.

There is no evidence in support of

The records and controls involved, concerned

the initialling by the grievant of a "pinball sheet" prepared
by Johnson, and which listed jobs assigned and the time that
each job was completed.

It had nothing to do with farebovces,

and there is no evidence that Ryan knew, or even would have
known in the normal course of his duties that the grievant did
.
not initial those records on a regular
basis.
"

In short, I

find no connection between the grievant's failure to initial
those reports, or even any omissions by Foreman Johnson in
-

connection with the maintenance of those reports, and Ryan's
theft of the farebox.
Indeed if an "atmosphere conducive to theft" exist::
was much more because of the Employer's then existing pr i.ct ice
to leave fareboxes with money in them, inside unattended buses
in the depot.

This practice has now changed, but at the time

I think that that is what tempted Ryan to take an unattended
bus out of the depot for the purpose of stealing the contents
of the farebox.

-4Accordingly I Recommend dismissal of that portion of the
Charge which alleges that the grievant's "proper performance of
....duties would have prevented the occurrences...."
As to that portion of the Charge alleging that the
grievant failed to require Johnson to maintain proper records
and controls the Employer has not shown just what it is that
Johnson did not do properly for which the grievant, as his
supervisor might be held responsible.

The record does sbow,

undisputedly, that the grievant may not have examined the "pinball sheets" as regularly as required, because he failed to
initial them.

By failing to do that, I suppose it can be

argued that the grievant thereby failed to be certain thrt
Johnson prepared the "pinball sheet" properly, and that i
have led Johnson to believe that he could be lax in the
tion of those sheets and reports.

re para

However there is no evidc

that the pinball sheets were not filled out or completed pi.
ly, but only that the grievant failed to initial them as
required.

So that if the grievant did not discharge his d>, '

fully, there is no evidence, as to those sheets and repo 'ts,
"
that it created laxity, poor performance, or inefficienc
Johnson's part.

Therefore it is recommended that the Ch

as it relates to the allegation that the grievant failec.
require Foreman Johnson to maintain proper records and co

-cols,

be dismissed.
Moreover, the testimony indicates that the grievar
failure to initial the sheets as required may have been a :ere

-5-

.

technical omission on his part.

Depot Administrator Canosa

testified that overtime worked by employees is obtained from
the "pinball sheets", and that the responsibility for reporting overtime work was among the grievant's duties.

He further

testified that the grievant must have looked at the "pinball
sheets" regularly as required because he properly reported the
overtime worked and must have obtained the information from
the "pinball sheets."
Based on the foregoing the only charge against the
grievant that has been proved is his technical failure to
initial the "pinball sheets."

To that extent the charge is

sustained.
The grievant has already served three days of the ten
day suspension Recommended below.

I am satisfied that that

is an adequate penalty for that portion of the Charge which
the Employer has proved.

If initialling the "pinball sheets"

is a required duty, it must be performed.
warrants discipline.

Failure to do so

It is not for me to judge the relative

importance or unimportance of a required duty.
Accordingly

it is Recommended that the Recommendation

that Michael McGrath be suspended for ten days, be modified
and reduced to a three day suspension.

Eric A . Schmertzl
Hearana Officer v

In The Matter of A Disciplinary Appeal
between
Transit Supervisors Benevolent Association
RECOMMENDATION
and
Manhattan and Bronx Transit Operating
Authority

In accordance with Section (2) Paragraph (b) of the
Agreement between the Manhattan and Bronx Transit Operating
Authority hereinafter referred to as the "Operating Authority",
and the Transit Supervisors Benevolent Association hereinafter
referred to as the "Union", the Undersigned is authorized to
hear appeals from disciplinary decisions of the Director of
Labor Relations and Personnel and "shall have the authority to
recommend to the Executive Officer, Labor Relations and
Personnel, that the decision of the Director of Labor Relations
and Personnel be sustained, overruled or modified."
The instant proceeding is such an appeal.

The Operating

Authority and the Union, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties", stipulated the issue to be decided as follows:
Should the decision of the Acting Director
of Labor Relations and Personnel to discharge Senior Dispatcher Albert LaMarch be
sustained, overruled or modified?
Hearings were held at 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York
on November 4, November 21 and December 9, 1975 at which time
Mr. LaMarch hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the parties appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

-2-

The charge against the grievant is "misconduct, in that
he mishandled revenue and wrongfully

appropriated Operating

Authority property on Saturday, November 2, 1974."
Preliminarily

the parties are reminded that this is a

disciplinary proceeding, not a criminal case.

Although the

charge, no matter how euphemistically phrased, parallels the
crime of "theft", and the standard of proof which the Operating
Authority must meet is higher than what would be required in
other types of disciplinary cases, it does not rise to the level
required to prove a criminal charge.
It is well settled that circumstantial evidence of
adequate quality and quantum may be supportive of a criminal
charge.

Accordingly

circumstantial

a disciplinary

charge may be sustained on

evidence which meets the requisite evidentiary

standards of a disciplinary

proceeding.

At the hearing I concluded that for disciplinary purposes,
the Operating Authority had met its burden of establishing a
prima facie case in support of the charge.

Therefore I denied

the grievantfs motion to dismiss the charge at the conclusion
of the Operating Authority's direct case, and required the
grievant to present his defenses.
Based on the entire record before me I now hold that the
charge has been proved by the requisite standard and quantum of
proof required in such cases.

-3The Operating Authority established that for a period of
time including November 1-2, 1974, there were unexplained losses
of bus revenues at the 100th street depot where the grievant
worked.

The amount of missing revenue for that day (i.e. the

working day of November 1 continuing

into the morning of

November 2) was $859.97.
On November 2, 1974 at approximately 2:30 to 2:45 A.M.
after the grievant finished a 4 P.M. to midnight tour he was
involved in an automobile accident.

At the scene of the

accident the police found in and about the grievant"s car,
various denominations
including

156 tokens.

of coins totalling $207.74 in value,
The grievant acknowledged that these

coins and tokens were in his car and in his possession at the
time of the accident.

(Specifically the police retrieved

156 tokens, 371 quarters, 455 dimes, 278 nickels, 99 pennies).
It is reasonable to assume that because the coins were scatterec
about the street as well as in the car, not all the coins
originally in the grievant's possession were recovered.
The foregoing facts, particularly the grievant's possession
of so many tokens, and the established revenue losses at the
100th street depot over a period of time encompassing November
1-2 makes out a prima facie case in support of the Operating
Authority's charge that the grievant "mishandled and appropriated
Operating Authority's

revenue", requiring an explanation on

his behalf.
The grievant's explanation and the other testimony and
evidence offered in support thereof, are not credible or

-4believable.
I cannot believe that the coins and the tokens came
from piggy banks which the grievant and Mrs. Commons kept in
their apartment.

Why were so many tokens placed in and com-

mingled with coins in one or two piggy banks? The grievant's
and Mrs. Commons explanations are implausible, illogical and
unsatisfactory.

The first explanation is that each evening

they would empty their loose change into the piggy banks.

If

so, I fail to see any logical reason why tokens would be included.

The grievant has a transit pass and does not use tokens.

Mrs. Commons testified that she regularly purchased tokens in
advance for herself and for her two sons so that the three of
them would have an adequate supply to tokens for some period
of time ahead.

If that was true I am persuaded that the tokens

would not be put into a piggy bank where they would be inaccessible or difficult to retrieve for regular and continued
use.

Rather, the normal procedure would be to segregate the

tokens from the rest of the change, placing the former in some
location other than in the piggy bank, especially when, as
Mrs. Commons stated, her two sons constantly needed tokens as
well as money.

The other explanation advanced is that a quantity

of tokens was maintained in a separate bowl where they were
accessible for use; and that only when Mrs. Commons went to
the hospital were those segregated tokens placed in the piggy
banks.

The latter explanation is not believable because Mrs.

-5Coinmons' two sons remained at home and obviously, based on her
own testimony, needed tokens while she was away.

I doubt that

she or the grievant would have deprived them of the available
tokens (even though the testimony is that that was their intent'
or would have changed the alleged procedure regarding the
accumulation of tokens, merely because she went to the hospital
Moreover I think it highly improbable that the grievant
and Mrs. Commons would accumulate a large number of tokens in
advance. He had a transit pass.
limited.

Her income was relatively

She aided her sons financially.

By her own testimony

she made no contribution to the token supply while she was in
the hospital.

It follows, based on her own story, that a

quantity of more than 156 tokens must have been accumulated at
the time she entered the hospital, diminished by her sons' use
during her period of hospitalization.

I simply do not believe

that that happened, and hence cannot credit the testimony in
that regard.
Nor can I believe Mrs. Commons' testimony or that of the
grievant that the piggy banks were emptied by the grievant to
obtain money to pay possible medical and hospital bills, and other
incidental expenses attendant to Mrs. Commons' hospital stay,
for and in anticipation of her release from the hospital, and tc
buy food and pay the apartment expenses upon her return

-6from the hospital.

I find no reason why there was a need to

obtain the coins, convert them into bills, and take money
the hospital for any of those purposes.

to

Mrs. Commons had

medical insurance which covered virtually all of her doctor
and hospital expenses.

She is a licensed practical nurse,

and knows I believe, that most of her bills were or would be
paid by medical insurance and that there is no

requirement

to pay outstanding doctor bills, if any, in order to be
released from the hospital.

As it turned out, and I believe

Mrs. Commons knew it, her total bill upon release from the
hospital was only about $26, for telephone and television.
Manifestly there was no need at all to take money to the
hospital to pay for such non-hospital expenses as apartment
rent, telephone or food.

For those items the money should be

at her home, to be used for those purposes when she returned
from the hospital.
Additionally, the grievant's story regarding the arrangements to convert the coins into cash is bizarre.

In that

regard I cannot believe him, Mrs. Commons or Mrs. Commons'
brother.

The coins which purportedly were obtained from the

piggy banks after midnight following the conclusion of the
grievant's shift, were to be taken by the grievant to Mrs.
Commons' brother who would convert them to bills "because he
could always use coins in his business."

But the transaction

was arranged to take place in the early hours of the morning,

-7not at her brother's home or place of business, but at a
public bar.

And it was not planned that the brother would

provide the grievant with the equivalent in bills that very
night or morning.

Under that circumstance, I fail to see the

urgency of the transaction at that hour, nor can I understand
why it was to take place at that locale.

Also, the grievant

testified that he did not know how much money the total quantity
of coins was worth.
brother.

He and Mrs. Commons "trusted" her

I cannot accept this explanation because I think it

abnormal for the grievant, who had not previously actively
engaged in such a transaction with the brother, not to have
counted the coins or make a reasonably accurate estimate of
their value before traveling to turn them over. The grievant
stated that he did not have time to make such a count.

Yet

by his own testimony before he went to the apartment to empty
the piggy banks he spent some time in a different bar following completion of his shift.

So he did have time to make a

count, and I am constrained to conclude that he would have
done so, had he needed the money for the purposes alleged and
had the coins actually come from that source.

Moreover, as

he emptied the coins from the piggy banks into bags, he
certainly would have noticed tokens among them, if it is true
that tokens were commingled with the coins.

He would have I

believe, as a matter of normal course, removed the tokens
from the balance of the coins before turning the coins over

-8for conversion to bills.
is lame.

The grievant's case on this point

It is not that Mrs. Commons' brother was expected

to convert tokens but that he would return them.

Why have

him do that needless act when it could have been easily
obviated by the grievant removing the tokens initially.
In separate parts and as a totality, the grievant's
defense is unpersuasive and unbelievable, and fails entirely
to rebut the Operating Authority's case.

Because I cannot

believe his defense, I must conclude that it is untrue, and
that he acquired the coins and the tokens in the manner
alleged by the Operating Authority.

I hold therefore that

he is culpable of "misconduct" in that he "mishandled revenue
and wrongfully appropriated Operating Authority property"
within the meaning of the charge and allegations against him.
For all the foregoing reasons the Undersigned makes the
following RECOMMENDATION:
The decision of the Acting Director of
Labor Relations and Personnel to discharge Albert LaMarch should be sustained.

Er4£ J. Schmert;
February 9, 1976

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0039 76

UAW Local 197
and
Marlin-Rockwell Division of TRW, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the Agreement
by refusing to bump out John E. Combs
(an employee on the Schedule B 270 list)
in favor of Charles Zimbowski?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on June 3,
1976 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was expressly waived.
Combs is the incumbent on the Duplex Grinder with Setup.
His seniority date is May 16, 1973.

Zimbowski, with experience

as both a Notch Grinder and a Slot Grinder, and with a seniority
date of March 24, 1959 was denied the opportunity to bump Combs
out of the Duplex Grinder job, at the time of a layoff.
The Company contends that Combs is immune from the bump
by virtue of being on the Schedule B 270 list persuant to Section
14.4.2 of the Agreement which reads:
The Company shall be entitled to hire or
retain any employee irrespective of seniority
who possesses exceptional value to the operation of the Company by reason of special
knowledge, training, or ability to perform
a particular kind of work provided that this
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exception shall not have effect in
cases involving common labor, not to
exceed two per cent (270) of the total
number of employees in one (1) year.
The names of such employees shall be
listed under Schedule B which will be
given to the Chairman of the Committee
each six (6) months. The Union shall
have six (6) working days after receipt
of such listing to question the assignments.
The Union's right to challenge the propriety of Combs'
inclusion on the 27, list was expressly reserved in the
Company's fourth step answer dated October 27, 1975.

The

Company stated:
Since the Company has the right to
establish such a list and the Union
the right to question the list, the
real test of the validity of assignments to the list will come when an
employee with seniority makes a request
to "bump" an employee on the list.
Zimbowski's effort to bump Combs is the first such
test.
As I see it, this case is not so much a question of
whether the incumbent on the Duplex Grinder is properly
included on the 2% list by reason of "exceptional value to
the operation of the Company. . . . (because) of special
knowledge, training, or ability to perform a particular kind
of work. . . . ", but rather whether Zimbowski possesses the
threshold ability and qualifications to assume the Duplex
Grinder duties.
The Union argues that the 270 list should be confined
to very special circumstances and employees with exceptional

-3talents, not replaceable by other employees; that the list
was intended to be both small and unique; that the Duplex
Grinder position does not meet that test; and that Zimbowski,
based on his prior work experience, especially as a Notch
Grinder, was qualified to work as a Duplex Grinder and should
have been allowed to bump Combs who was substantially junior
in seniority.
Though the Union has shown several instances in which
the Company deleted employees from the 27o list upon the
Union's objection, it obviously does not follow that a mere
objection by the Union invalidates the inclusion of an
employee or a job classification on the 270 list.

Where the

Company agreed with the Union, the employee or the job was
removed.

Where the Company did not agree with the Union, it

then becomes a grievable issue.

Therefore the Union's mere

objection to Combs' inclusion, or to the inclusion of the
Duplex Grinder, did not invalidate those listings, but rather,
as previously stated, preserved the Union's right to challenge
the Combs incumbency when a layoff occurred and an employee
such as Zimbowski sought to bump into the Duplex Grinder job.
Section 14.3.1 of the Agreement provides in pertinent
part, that in the event of a layoff, "affected employees will
be placed on work as follows:"
(c) Work they have the ability to perform,
at labor grade equal to or lower than
their current labor grade.

-4It follows therefore that unless Zimbowski is
qualified to work as a Duplex Grinder, or possesses the
requisite threshold qualifications which would entitle him
to a reasonable period on that job to demonstrate his skill
in performing his duties, there is no valid challenge in
this case to the inclusion of Combs and the Duplex Grinder
on the Schedule 8 2% list.

In short, unless Zimbowski's

abilities and qualifications are established, this is not
the case to challenge Combs' inclusion on the special 2%
list.
It is on this latter point that the Union's case
founders.

Based on the entire record in this proceeding I

cannot conclude that Zimbowski possesses the requisite
ability or qualifications to make the lateral move from
Labor Grade 7 Notch Grinder to Labor Grade 7 Duplex Grinder
and to assume and perform the duties of the latter job.

The

evidence and testimony on the comparability or applicability
of the Notch Grinder job to the Duplex Grinder is sharply
conflicting and controverted.

The Union witnesses assert

that the jobs are reasonably similar and that Zimbowski's
experience as a Notch Grinder qualifies him for Duplex Grind
ing, or at least gives him sufficient experience to be able
to perform the Duplex Grinder duties satisfactorily within
a short period of time.
otherwise.

The Company witnesses testify

They assert that the jobs are dissimilar; that

the skills are not transferable; and that from six to fifteen
months would be necessary before Zimbowski was capable of

-5performing the job to a level of minimal acceptability.

I

consider this respective evidence and testimony to be offsetting and hence indeterminative.

Left that way, Zimbowski's

qualifications and abilities to work as a Duplex Grinder
remain in question, especially in view of the fact that
Zimbowski did not testify and therefore did not give direct
evidence of his experience, his skills and the nature of
the work which he has performed.

Contrary-wise Combs did

testify about the work he does, the difficulties he
experienced in becoming proficient and the length of time
required to train him to a level of competence.

On balance,

the testimony produced by the Union is second hand.

It

represents the views of those who think that the Notch
Grinder job contains duties transferrable to the Duplex
Grinder, and the views of others concerning Zimbowski's
ability and experience.

On the other hand the Company

offered testimony of persons more directly familiar with
the duties of the Duplex Grinder, the duties of the Notch
Grinder, and the time and complexities involved in training
a Notch Grinder to assume and perform the work of a Duplex
Grinder.

Additionally, the Company witnesses testified

without refutation, that the business needs of the Company,
at the time of the grievance and presently, require a
competent and experienced Duplex Grinder, and that the
Company cannot afford the time and reduced productivity

-6which would be attendant to the training of a new Duplex
Grinder, whether Zimbowski or anyone else, replacing Combs.
The Company pointed out, again without refutation, that the
business needs of the Company were not so acute or demanding during the time that Combs was being trained.

The

contract does not require the Company to accord an employee
a training period on a job into which he bumps and I do not
find arbitrary or unreasonable the Company's conclusion
that a lengthy training period would have been required to
develop Zimbowski's capabilities on the Duplex Grinder.

I

hold therefore that Combs possessed the special knowledge,
training or ability to perform the work of the Duplex
Grinder and that Zimbowski did not.

As such whether he

belongs on the 270 list or not, Combs is immune from a bump
by

Zimbowski.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the

Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegation
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the
Agreement by refusing to bump out
John E. Combs in favor of Charles
Zimbowski.

Eric J'. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 19, 1976
STATE Of New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this nineteenth day of July, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
National Union of Hospital & Health
Care Employees, District 1199 E

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1117 75 S

and
Maryland General Hospital

In accordance with Article 13 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated December 1, 1974 between the National Union of
Hospital & Health Care Employees, District 1199 E, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union", and Maryland General Hospital, hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital", the Undersigned was selecte
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute relating to the
Union's grievance #131 dated August 1, 1975.
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on January 14, 1976
at which time representatives of the Union and Hospital appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was expressly waived.
The parties could not agree on a stipulated issue.

Therefore

I dleem the issue to be the Union's grievance as filed, and as
processed through the grievance procedure, together with the
Hospital's answer.
The grievance reads:
"Hospital is unreasonably denying
employees vacations."

-2The Hospital's answer reads:
"The Hospital is in no way unreasonably denying the Employees vacations.
Vacations are being granted according
to the contract."
More specifically the Union asserts that due to staff layoffs
in the Nursing Services, remaining employees were not accorded
the same "pattern" of vacation during the more desirable vacation
months of June, July and August of 1975 as was followed in prior
years.

The Union contends that some thirteen employees in the

Nursing Services were denied their first and in some cases also
their second choices of vacation periods.

In general the Union

challenges the right of the Hospital, as a consequence of staff
reductions, to unreasonably change the practices and "patterns"
of vacation scheduling, from what had obtained in prior vacation
years.

Acknowledging the Hospital's right to effectuate layoffs,

the Union nonetheless maintains that staff reductions may not
unreasonably encroach on the rights of employees to select and
take vacation periods of their choosing, even if it means that
the Hospital must hire or recall temporary staff to maintain
nursing services during vacations.
The Hospital denies that it changed vacation "patterns"
during the summer of 1975.

It contends that in 1975 as in prior

years, the same number of employees were granted their first
choice for vacations, and that other employees were scheduled
for vacations pursuant to their seniority and in accordance with
Article 8 (Section 8.3) of the collective bargaining agreement.
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It argues that even if more employees in 1975 had to select
alternative vacation periods because of reductions in staff,
the Hospital nonetheless maintained the same vacation "pattern"
by granting the same number of vacations on the day and night
shifts during the summer months in 1975 as it granted in prior
vacation years.
The Hospital denies any contractual obligation to hire or
call in temporary staff during the vacation periods, so as to
accord the full-time employees their full vacation preferences.
It is undisputed that all employees entitled to vacations
including the thirteen previously referred to, received and
completed the vacation to which they were entitled sometime
during the 1975 vacation year.
I am in general agreement with the Union that the Hospital
is not permitted to unreasonably diminish or vitiate the vacation
rights of employees under Section 8.3 as a result of staff
reductions.

For example, the Hospital would not be permitted to

eliminate entirely or postpone into a subsequent vacation year
accrued vacation entitlements merely because it didn't have
enough staff.

But the facts and evidence in this case do not

establish an unreasonable denial of vacations to employees during 1975, nor an unreasonable encroachment on the vacation rights
of the employees in violation of Section 8.3 of the contract.
The Union's assertion that thirteen employees were unreasonably or unfairly denied their first and/or second choice of
vacation period is mere allegation.

None of the thirteen employees

-4appeared or testified, so I am unable to determine based on
probative evidence, how they were treated and why.

Additionally

Section 8.3 does not require the Hospital to grant an employee
his preference for vacation but rather that:
"Each employee's vacation period shall
be designated by the Hospital to meet
the requirement of operating conditions,
provided however that the period preferable to the employee on a classification
seniority basis shall be selected whenever
possible. (Underscoring supplied).
In the absence of more direct evidence from the Union, I
cannot conclude that the Hospital did not meet the foregoing
requisites of Section 8.3.

It scheduled vacations pursuant

to its "operating conditions" (which included some reduction
in staff); and yet apparently maintained the same number on
vacation on the day and night shift during the three desirable
months of 1975, as had been the case in the prior years.

Also

those employees who were not granted their preference were preempted for that particular vacation period only because of
greater "classification seniority" of employees who were given
that time off.

In both the foregoing situations the Hospital

appears to have met the explicit contractual conditions, and
hence no contract violation has been shown.
Though the Hospital could have called in temporary employees
to cover during the vacation period (as apparently it has done
as a matter of practice in the Dietary Department) I find no
contractual requirement that it do so, and there has been no
practice of having done so previously with the Nursing Services.
Additionally it should be noted that the Nursing Service has
approximately

two hundred employees.

If there are grievants

in this case they are the thirteen whom the Union claims were
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were not granted their vacation preferences.

Presumably

therefore, the remaining one hundred eighty-seven either
received the vacation periods they sought, or some satisfactory
alternative, or did not feel that they were unreasonably denied
vacation rights during the 1975 vacation year.

I do not

think that thirteen out of two hundred constitutes an unreasonable or otherwise improper implementation of Section 8.3 of
the contract, especially under the explicit conditions set
forth therein.
In summary, though the critical positions of both sides
have been presented to me principally by allegation, unsupported by direct or otherwise probative evidence, the burden is
on the Union to establish the elements of its grievance; not
on the Hospital in the absence of a prima facie contract
breach to prove its contractual compliance.

In this case,

especially without the testimony of any of the thirteen
grievants, and without any evidentiary showing that the
Hospital substantially or unreasonably changed the 1975
vacation patterns from the practices of prior years, the Union
has not met that burden.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance #131 dated
August 1, 1975 is denied.

Erix: J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: January 26, 1976
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-sixth day of January, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New Castle Police Benevolent
Association, Inc.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. A76-68

and
Town of New Castle

In accordance with Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement dated April 24, 1974 between the New Castle Police
Benevolent Association, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Association" and the Town of New Castle, hereinafter referred
to as the "Town" the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Town, through its Police Department,
violate Article XVI Section 2 of the contract
in connection with duty schedules with respect
to Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, 1975?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 28, 1976 at which time representatives of the Town and the Association appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The essential facts are undisputed.

Within two or three

weeks of the two holidays referred to in the stipulated issue,
the Police Chief changed the duty schedule for those dates by
reducing the number of patrolmen scheduled to work and by notifying certain patrolmen who had been scheduled to work that they
would be off either or both of those days.
two reasons for doing so.

The Police Chief had

First, it was determined that because
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of the absence of many citizens from the community during those
holidays, and a diminution in crime on those days,fewer police
officers were required to be on duty; and second, the Town's
Board of Supervisors had directed the Police Department to
"reduce its budget, consistent with public safety", in other
words "to save money."
The Association asserts that the Town may not change a
posted duty schedule inside of six months of its applicability.
It relies on Article XVII Section 2 which reads:
A minimum of six (6) months duty schedule
shall be posted and maintained at all times.
It also points to Article IV (Work Periods) Section 4 which reads;
in pertinent part:
All shift assignments and duty schedules
shall be posted in accordance with Article
XVI Sections 1 and 2 hereof. The preparation of said schedule and assignments shall
be on an equal rotating basis among all
members herein unless specifically altered
by voluntary agreement of the Association,
the affected employee, and the Chief
The Association's argument is that under Article XVI Section
2, as reinforced by Article IV Section 4, the Police Chief lacked
the contractual authority to unilaterally change the posted work
schedule for Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, 1975, two to
three weeks prior to those holidays.

To do so, with less than

six months notice argues the Association, requires mutual agreement of the parties including the agreement of the affected
employee.

-3The Town relies on Section I of Article XVI and particularly the last part thereof which I have underscored, as follows:
There shall be equal posting of duty
schedule and equal and consecutive days
off for Lieutenants, Sergeants, Detectives
and Patrolmen, subject to the needs of the
department as determined by the Chief of
Police.
The Town contends that the action of the Chief of Police
in reducing the number of employees to work on the two holidays
in question was an exercise of his contractual authority to
schedule Patrolmen "subject to the needs of the department."
The Town asserts that its factual determination that fewer crimes
took place on Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day together with
the absence of citizens from the community on those days, reasonably justified the decision of the Chief of Police to reduce the
work force consistent with public safety, and that the undisputed
fiscal constraints of the budget further legitimatized his action.
It is a well settled rule of contract law that specific
provisions of a contract preempt those provisions which are either
general or ambiguous.

The language relied upon by the Town,

namely Section I Article XVI is both general and ambiguous.

The

phrase "subject to the needs of the department as determined by
the Chief of Police" is a general pronouncement.

It is ambiguous

because it is not clear whether the "needs of the department"
relate to the "equal posting" and "equal and consecutive days off
for the Patrolmen and Officers, or whether it is a condition
applicable to the subsequent sections in Article XVI, namely,

-4and particularly
Section 2.

in this case, to the six month provision of

The Town argues the latter, but the former interpreta-

tion is equally logical and reasonable.
On the other hand Section 2 of Article XVII and Section 4
of Article IV are more specific and clearer.

The former requires

the posting of duty schedules at least six months in advance of
their applicability and requires, unconditionally, that those
schedules be "maintained at all times."

The latter mandates

that the preparation of the schedules and assignments

(on an

equal rotating basis) may be specifically altered only by the
joint agreement of the Association, the affected employee and
the Chief of Police.
To my mind the latter two explicit contract provisions
must be given preeminence over the language relied upon by the
Town.

Accordingly, general and routine changes in posted and

scheduled work assignments may not be made unilaterally by the
Chief of Police inside of six months of the date those schedules
are applicable.
However this is not to say that there are no circumstances
under which the Chief of Police may make changes in work assignments unilaterally within the six month period.

The Police

Department is an emergency force, and the Police Chief must
maintain the authority and flexibility to meet emergencies and
other unforeseen or unforeseeable conditions requiring police
action.

In an emergency, where the incidence of crimes unexpect-

edly increases; where there is a precipitous flareup of criminal

-5activity or other breaches of the peace; or where unexpected
and unforeseen circumstances arise requiring an immediate or
different police response (including not only the increase in
the work force but also its decrease), the Police Chief must
retain the authority, explicit or implicit under this contract,
to change work assignments to meet those "needs of the department. "
However the instant circumstances do not meet those tests.
The survey showing a reduction in crime and fewer citizens in
the community during the two holidays in question does not
represent an emergency or an unforeseen or unforeseeable
condition warranting a change in the work schedules on short
notice.

The same is true of the Town's fiscal condition, which,

in my judgement was not and is not so precipitous, unforeseen
or unpredicatable

as to warrant an exception to the six months

notice requirement set forth in Article XVI Section 2, and
incorporated by reference in Article IV Section 4 of the
contract.

Accordingly the changes in the work schedule of

patrolmen because of a diminution of crime on Thanksgiving Day
and Christmas Day, because of temporary reduced population,
and/or because of budget restrictions is something which can be
planned six months or more in advance and incorporated into
the schedule of work assignments then posted.
I do not consider the remedy sought by the Association
in this case to be either illogical, unprecedented or unreasonable.

It seeks pay for Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, 1975

-6for those patrolmen who were scheduled to work those days but
who did not do so because of the change in schedules unilaterally
promulgated by the Chief of Police.

The Town argues that

because employees generally seek holidays off to be with their
families, it should not be required to pay patrolmen who were
given those days off even though they were previously scheduled
to work.

The Arbitrator interprets the contract and does not

make a psychological judgement on the wishes or predilection
of particular employees.

It is also true however that employees

on occassion, accept and indeed look forward to working on
premium pay days in order to gain the additional compensation.
Therefore, in the instant case I do not consider it inappropriate
to grant the Association the remedy sought, namely pay for
Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, 1975 to those patrolmen
who were scheduled to work but did not do so because of the
unilateral order of the Chief of Police, in an amount equal to
what they would have earned had they worked those days.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Town of New Castle, through its Police
Department violated Article XVI Section 2
of the contract in connection with duty schedules
with respect to Thanksgiving Day and Christmas
Day, 1975. Those patrolmen who were scheduled
to work on either or both of those days, and
who did not do so because of the unilateral
order of the Chief of Police, shall be compensated
for either or both of those days as if they had
worked.

Eric J. Schmertz
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DATED: August
STATE OF
OF New
New 1York )s s
COUNTY OF New York )'
On this
day of August, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-and- THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

AWARD
Case #A-479-75

and
The City of New York (Fire Department)

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
1. The layoffs and manning reductions effectuated
by the City, and complained of by the Union in
this proceeding, did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement, The rights of the City
to effectuate layoffs and manning reductions
under the contract and under Article XXVII thereof have been fully exercised and are now completed
as a response to the City's fiscal crisis.
2. The safety of the person and property of the
public, and the impact on the firemen as a
result of layoffs and manning reductions require, and I therefore direct, that from the
present complement of the Department and the
present manning levels of the companies, there
shall be no further layoffs or manning reductions of bargaining unit firemen for economic
reasons.
3. In the event firemen who have been laid-off
are recalled and assigned regular firemen duties,
and the funds which fiscally support those recalls
are not otherwise legally restricted or conditioned
as to use or purpose, the manning levels of the
relevant contract provisions shall be reactivated
and become applicable to those recalls. The recalled firemen shall be assigned to active companies
in a manner that reestablishes the contractual
manning levels which existed before their layoffs.
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4. I retain jurisdiction in this matter to
resolve any disputes over the interpretation, application and implementation of
this AWARD.

Eric X- Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: February \
STATE OF New York
COUNTY

1976
)

On this
'* '
day of February, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS

ASSOCIATION

-and- THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters

Association

OPINION
Case #A-479-75

and
The City of New York (Fire Department)

On or after July 1, 1975 the City laid-off 894 firemen and
reduced the minimum number of firemen available for work at the
start of each tour of duty from five to four in 162 engine
companies, from six to five in 29 ladder companies, from six to
five in all squad companies, from six to five in all rescue
companies and from ten to nine in three combination fire companies
(CFC's).
The Union alleges that the foreging reductions violate
Article XXVII, Section 1, and Articles XXVII-A, Section 3 of the
collective bargaining agreement, commonly referred to as the
"Five-Man Manning" provisions, and further that those reductions
are inimical to the maintenance of public safety.
More specifically the Union contends that Article XXVII
Section 1 creates an absolute requirement for the manning of all
Fire Department line units, with the exception of those units
specifically excluded, with a minimum of five firemen available
for work at the beginning of each tour of duty, and that Article
XXVII-A, Section 3 creates an absolute requirement for the manning of certain specified units with a minimum of more than five
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firemen.

Acknowledging the City's right to effectuate layoffs,

the Union argues that these manning requirements limit the City's
right to effectuate layoffs in the Fire Department, to the
elimination of fire companies.
The City responds that such manning requirements are neither
absolute nor a guarantee, but rather that the City is relieved
of the minimum manning schedules under the conditions set forth
in Article XXVII, Section 10.

The City asserts that those

conditions have been met, specifically by the fiscal crisis with
which the City is confronted, and therefore the manning reductions
were contractually proper.
In addition to several procedural meetings with representatives of the parties, formal hearings were held on October 13,
28, 29, 30, December 2, 18, 1975, January 5, 12 and 29, 1976,
at which time representatives of the City, the Fire Department
and the Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

It is obvious that the basic dispute between the parties
involves a question of contract interpretation.
generates concomitant

But that question

questions regarding the safety of the public

and the limits of safety for firemen which manifestly are of
serious concern to all parties involved in this dispute.

To the

extent indicated, those latter questions are implicit within the
collective bargaining agreement and hence fall within my
authority to determine.

It is undisputed that the personal

-3safety and welfare of citizens of the City of New York may be
fundamentally affected by any contractual relationship between
the City and its firemen which deals with the level, availability
and quality of fire protection.

The contract issue in this case

has that affect, making inexorable and proper the consideration
of public safety along with any interpretation and application
of the contract term.
The pertinent sections of Article XXVII and XXVII-A are:
"ARTICLE XXVII-Five-Man Manning
Until there is a substantial change in firefighting technology, all companies, including
the Marine Division (except Marine No. 4 with
four men and the satellite boats with two men
each) are to be manned by no less than 5 men
available to respond at the beginning of each
tour, under the following guidelines:
1. The Department may equalize manpower among
the companies."....
"10. Notwithstanding the above, the City may
exercise its general right to reduce the work
force. However, the City agrees that reductions in the work force should not be used as
a subterfuge designated to curtail rights set
forth above. In the event of a reduction in
the work force, a claim that it was used as a
subterfuge designed to curtail the above rights,
shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of this Agreement."....
"ARTICLE XXVII-A-Productivity Issues
Section 1. The Union recognizes that the provisions of this Article XXVII are matters
concerning which the City has the right to act
unilaterally. Notwithstanding the above, the
parties agree to the following sections.
Section 2. Flexible Response. The Union recognizes the unilateral right of the City to determine the type and level of response, Citywide .

-4Section 3. Six and Seven Man Companies.
A. The City shall furnish the Union with a
list of Companies which shall be manned by
either 6 or 7 men as indicated thereon for
the period from January 1, 1972 to July 1,
1972. Those companies so designated as
seven-man companies shall require the seventh
man only during the applicable Adaptive Response
period designated by the Department. At all
other times such companies shall be manned by
six men. In the even of a vacancy in such
seven-man companies, the Department shall obtain the required extra man pursuant to the
guidelines set forth in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5
of Article XXVII of this Agreement.
B. Commencing thereafter, upon ten (10) days
notice to the Union, with the right of discussion
within the ten (10) days, the City may make
changes in the list.
C. At least 6 months shall elapse before a
Company which has been changed can be changed
again.
D. After September 1, 1972, upon request of
the Union the Impartial Chairman may review
the foregoing program and may make recommendations ."....
It is clear that under Section 10 of Article XXVII the City
has the right to "reduce the work force", or in other words to
effectuate layoffs.

Inasmuch as this Section is part of the

"five-man manning" clause it follows that the right to reduce
the work force applies to the manning level set forth in Article
XXVII.

Based on the record before me including my knowledge of

the negotiations between the parties leading to the foregoing
contract provision, I am fully satisfied that the City's
"general right to reduce the work force" included

the right to

reduce the "minimum manning" levels as well as the elimination of
fire companies

in the event of a genuine fiscal crisis.

To limit

-5the City's right solely to the elimination of companies, and not
allow it to reduce manning, constructively prevents any meaningful quantity of layoffs in a fiscal crisis, because of the need
to retain most fire companies to maintain service.

I am

satisfied that such a restriction was not intended.
The explicit limitations on the City's right is that the
work force reduction shall not be "used as a subterfuge designed
to curtail...." the right to a continuation of the minimum manning level referred to.

We shall deal with the meaning of

"subterfuge" presently.
Again based on the record before me, including my knowledge
of the negotiations leading to the agreement on these contract
clauses, I am fully persuaded that the City's right to reduce
manning levels in the event of a genuine city-wide fiscal crisis
applies with equal force to the minimum manning levels set forth
in Article XXVII-A, Section 3, notwithstanding the Union's
argument that that Section is located in the contract subsequent
to Section 10 of the preceding Article, and arguably, might be
construed to immunize it from the "escape clause" relied on by
the City.

Additionally, in accordance with its managerial rights,

the City has disbanded the adaptive response companies referred
to in Section 3 of Article XXVII-A.

Therefore the manning require

ments of those companies are now moot.
I am fully satisfied that I know what the parties meant by
the word "subterfuge."

It would be a "subterfuge", in derogation

of the "right" to maintain five-man manning referred to in Article

-6XXVII and six or seven-man manning referred to in Section 3 of
Article XXVII-A if:
a. the City was not faced with a genuine city-wide
fiscal crisis;
b. the City falsified a fiscal crisis or represented
that it was confronted with a fiscal crisis when it
was not;
c. the City was confronted with a genuine fiscal
crisis but a reduction in the manning of fire
companies was not necessary to meet it;
d. the Fire Department, under a genuine fiscal
crisis, was required to bear the brunt of layoffs
and manning reductions unreasonably disproportionate to what was required of other bargaining unit
employees of the City, especially the uniformed
forces in the Police and Sanitation Departments;
and by logical inference
e. the City failed to reactivate the minimum
manning schedule which had been deactivated by
the fiscal crisis, when the crisis abated to the
extent that firemen were recalled from layoffs
and assigned regular fireman duties, provided
the funds or law under which they were returned
to work did not legally restrict or prohibit their
use to restore manning levels.
At present, in connection with the layoffs and reductions
in the manning levels involved in this case, the City is not
guilty of "subterfuge" or of using the reduction in the work
force "as a subterfuge designed to curtail the....rights" of
the Union or the firemen.

The fiscal crisis confronting the

City is real and awesome.

It is city-wide in its impact.

It

has necessitated massive reductions in city personnel, and those
reductions have been made in all departments.

The reductions

of bargaining unit personnel in other departments, especially
among the other uniformed services is not proportionately less

-7than what has been required of the Fire Department.

(Though I

am of the view that more non-essential exempt, provisional and
politically appointed employees of the City should have been
released, that circumstance is not germane to the defintion of
"subterfuge" for purposes of deciding this case.)
Accordingly

I must deny the Union's contention that the

manning provisions of Article XXVII and XXVII-A are minimum
guarantees and inviolate.

Rather I find present those circum-

stances set forth in Section 10 of Article XXVII which permit
the City to make the reductions it did.
However this is not to say that the contract or the City's
managerial prerogatives under the contract may be interpretated
to allow the City unlimited reductions in personnel and manning
levels even if confronted with a grave fiscal crisis.

There is

a point below which the Fire Department would be unable to meet
its essential and critical obligation to protect the lives and
property of the citizens.

In my view no clause may be interpret-

ated to permit personnel and manning reductions in such an
essential service as the Fire Department, as to reduce the
effectiveness of that Department below what is minimally required
to meet the needs for which the Department was established. This
is particularly true where as here, the service is unique to
government, and the citizenry can only look to the government
for that particular protection.

When the Department is unable

to provide the protection for which it was established and for
which the government is specially charged, government has defaulted on its mission.
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Therefore I deem the City's commitment to maintain the
Fire Department at sufficient strength and with sufficient
facilities to meet the needs of public safety to be an implicit
condition of the collective bargaining agreement between the
City and its firemen.

The minimum manning provisions of the two

foregoing Articles together with the conditions and exemptions
therein must be read and interpretated within the frame of the
needs of the public.
The New York City Fire Department is still an effective fire
fighting force.
carious.

But its effectiveness could not be more pre-

It has remained effective despite the elimination of

some companies, the layoff of firemen and reduced manning,
because of the continued dedication of the valiant men who man
the vehicles and who respond to an ever increasing number of
alarms with a readiness each time to risk their lives to save
the lives and property of others.

Any stereotype that civil

service employees are unproductive, whether true or not with
regard to other public employees, is ridiculous in the extreme
if applied to firefighters.

A significant number of fire

companies regularly work at or beyond a level approaching or
exceeding the "overwork" standard under the Weighted Response
Index which I promulgated a few years ago.

A look at the un-

disputed statistics of alarm increases, structural fire increases,
and other fire incidents, compared first with the long time
static complement of the fire fighters and then with these
recent reductions, belies any such invalid notion.

-9The continued effectiveness of the Department is also due
to the outstanding administrative efficiency of Fire Commissioner
John T. O'Hagan, probably the most knowledgeable and productive
Commissioner in the Department's history.

He has been imagina-

tive, inventive and dedicated to the maintenance of adequate
fire service against increasing difficulties.

The procedures

for exchanges, detailing, adaptive response, relocation, tactica'.
units, rapid water, etc., which he established, have played a
significant part in the extraordinarily productive record of the'
Fire Department in responding to and extinguishing fires with
probably less men and companies than would otherwise be
necessary.
Moreover the Department has been unstirting in its response
to the City's grave fiscal condition.

Because of budget

restrictions, it began to make economies as early as 1970.
year it disbanded two marine units.
companies and one marine unit.

That

In 1971 it disbanded four

In 1972 it disbanded eight

companies and relocated seven others.

In 1974 it disbanded

eight companies, two marine units and four support units; and
relocated three companies.

In 1975 it disbanded eight companies,

three divisions and five battalions.

Under an Austerity Program

as of December, 1974 it eliminated 348 fireman positions and
60 officer positions.

Under the Crisis Program as of July 1,

1975 it eliminated 1093 fireman positions and 15 fire officer
positions.

Under the Crisis Program effective November 1, 1975

it eliminated 333 firemen and 65 fire officers.

The Austerity

-10Program of December, 1974 represented savings of 13.2 million
dollars.

The Crisis Program of July 1, 1975 represented savings

of almost 23 million dollars.

The Crisis Program of November,

1975 represented savings of almost 8.2 million dollars.
During that same period, 1970 through 1975, the incidents
of fire alarms rose from approximately 260,000 a year to nearly
400,000.

During the same period the size of the fireman roster

fell from slightly over 11,500 to approximately 9,000.

In 1973

and 1974, 64 and 62 companies respectively (approximately 17.3
per cent of all companies in both years) made more than 4,000
runs annually.

In 1975, even with the exchange program and other

methods to reduce the work load, 80 companies or 22.7 per cent
made more than 4,000 runs.

Only the percentage of companies

reaching the incredible figure of 6,000 runs a year has been
reduced over the last two years.

Over the same period "serious

fires" or "structural fires" have increased from 66.7 per cent
to 77.1 per cent, and if compared with the period since 1967
the increase in that type of fire has been 47 per cent.

The

Department projects for the year 1976 that alarms will increase
to almost 460,000; structural fires to 57,000; non-structural
fires to 82,000; emergencies to 63,000 and false alarms to
257,000.
The potential for catastrophe is manifest.

A fire fighting

force of declining numbers and reduced manning cannot deal with
this substantial and continuing increase in the need for fire
protection. There is a point when men and equipment are spread

-11too thin.
The danger is that when a company is located from one
area to another (due to the elimination of the company at the
latter location or a general reduction in companies), its home
district may be left unprotected! or underprotected.
response time to a fire is critical.

The

Added delays of only a

few minutes could turn a fire otherwise easily controllable
into one that is beyond containment.
property is obvious.

The danger to lives and

With the elimination of companies, others

must travel longer distances and cover larger areas with the
attendant possibility of further delay in reaching a fire early
enough to control it.

With reduced manning there is one less

fireman to attack the fire.
may take that much longer.

Control or its extinguishment
Again, markedly evident is the

possibility of fatal delay by the loss of critical minutes and
because fewer hands are fighting the fire.

Bluntly, these

possibilities may well become inevitable realities if the Fire
Department suffers further manpower and manning reductions.

If

that happens the Department will have fallen below the point of
no return in its governmental obligations to the public.

It

would consitute, in my view, not simply a wrong "ordering of
priorities", but "governmental neglect."
A word about "five-man manning" is appropriate.

This

manning level was negotiated because the City, the Department,
and the Union were in agreement that the most effective way
tofight a fire was to send teams of at least five men with
each vehicle.

By no stretch of the imagination was it "feather-

-12bedding" or a "boondoggle."

On the contrary each man had a

specific job(s) and responsibility at the fire - ventilating,
searching for the fire location, stretching hose, operating
the engine or ladder equipment, opening the roof, maintaining
communication, and backing up others in case they are overcome
by smoke or falling debris.
Fire fighting in the City of New York is unique.
cannot be compared to any other city in this country.

It
The

structures of our city, concentration of our population,
traffic conditions, the incidents of fire, are so different,
so much more complex, intense and demanding than anywhere else,
that the manning requirement of our vehicles cannot be determined
by the manning complements of other cities.

I was deeply

impressed by the testimony of many fire officers, several of
them of senior rank who sincerely and eloquently explained the
difficulties and hazards involved in fighting serious fires
with less than five men on each vehicle.

Again the possibility

of unreasonable danger is present, this time to the firemen
themselves.

Firemen accept the hazards of their job.

They know

they are expected to risk their lives, and the tragic increase
in deaths and injuries in recent months is a sad testimony to
that dedication.

The current fiscal crisis will probably

continue for some time, necessitating the continuation of less
than five-man manning in those companies where the manning
levels have been reduced.

In those cases I know that the

firemen will continue to perform their work as before, even if

-la-

the "back-up man" which they previously were able to rely upon
for communication

and help or relief in emergency situations

is no longer present.

And so long as there are some companies

responding as well with five men, some of the slack may still
be taken up.

But if there are further reductions in men, the

possibility of unreasonable danger to firemen, beyond the danger
which they willingly assumed when they took on the job, may
become a cruel reality.
To repeat, the application and interpretation of Articles
XXVII and XXVII-A must be determined with these compelling
factors of safety in mind.

The City's right to reduce manning

levels and to layoff personnel is impliedly restricted by
levels of safety to the public and the level of reasonable
danger to the firemen.
The present layoffs and manning reductions, which are the
subject of this proceeding, leave the Fire Department "wounded"
but still effective.

But if the Department is to remain "under

siege" from those who are concerned only with cost reductions;
from those who see a dollar cut as a dollar saved, (as distinguished from cuts in other services which are subsidized in
part by State or Federal funds); or from those mindless people
who cruelly and criminally ring false alarms that call out a
fire company and make it unavailable to respond to a real fire
(and which has reached "epidemic" proportions requiring the
priority attention of law enforcement officials), this
Department, which Mayor Beame has called the most efficient in

-14City government will not be able to save lives and property as
before, or do the job for which it exists.
be moderated if not lifted.

The "siege" must

The Mayor has said that we have

done all we can in terms of cutting personnel in the essential
services to meet the budget crisis.
substantially the same thing.

The Governor has said

I believe, and quite properly so,

that Commissioner O'Hagan has taken the same position following
the massive economies T -hich he and his Department have already
made.

Towards this end, my authority permits the ruling that

the relevant contract sections involved in this case must and
were intended to be interpreted to stop layoffs and manning
reductions at the point where enough has been done and where
more may be synonymous with disaster.

A halt may be called,

when as here, there is already a "clear and present danger"
to the Department's vitality and viability.
Based on the foregoing I hold that the City, having
exercised its rights to reduce personnel and manning under its
general right to effectuate layoffs and under the provisions of
Article XXVII of the contract, has executed and completed its
rights in that regard as they relate to the City's fiscal
crisis.

Further layoffs or further reductions in manning would,

in my judgement, be violative of explicit and implicit conditions
and limitations of the contract.
If the City's fiscal crisis justified the layoffs and
manning reductions, and deactivated the manning schedules, it
logically follows that if the fiscal crisis abates, as evidencec
by the recall of firemen from layoff, and those firemen are

-15-

assigned regular firemen duties, the manning schedules should
be reactivated.

The proviso to this is that the funds or

law which support the recall do not contain restrictions which
would prohibit the assignment of firemen to restore manning
minimums.

This requirement is logically and obviously

reciprocal to the conditions and circumstances under which
the City is relieved of the manning requirements.

For the

City to fail to meet this reciprocal obligation under the
conditions set forth, would as I earlier indicated, constitute
a "subterfuge" within the meaning of Section 10 of Article
XXVII.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
-AND- CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Fire Officers Association

and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-541-76

City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issues are:
1. Did the City violate Article XIX, Section
1 and Article VI, Section 1 of the collective
bargaining agreement in its refusal to permit
delegates to attend duly authorized meetings
of the UFOA, and if so what shall be the remedy?
2. Did the City violate Article XIX, Section
1 and Article VI, Section 1 of the collective
bargaining agreement in its refusal to permit
Executive Board members to attend duly authorized meetings of the UFOA, and if so what shall
be the remedy?
The foregoing stipulated issues

notwithstanding, this

arbitration is more in the nature of a request for a prospective
declaratory judgement.
A hearing was held on March 15, 1976 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The parties filed post-hearing statements or

briefs.
Based on the record it is clear that by practice, Department
policy and as contemplated by Article VI, Section 1 of the
contract, the Fire Department has granted release time with pay
to Union Delegates actively at work at the time, to attend duly
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authorized meetings of the Union whether those meetings were
general membership meetings, special membership meetings or
Delegate meetings, provided the delegate was replaced pursuant
to said Article VI, Section 1.
I interpret the letter dated October 15, 1975 from John P.
Finneran then Assistant Director of the Office of Labor Relations
to Commissioner Stephen Murphy, First Deputy Fire Commissioner
as authoritative

confirmation

of the City's agreement with the

Union to accord the Union's Executive Board members the same
right to attend authorized Union meetings as was granted the
Union Delegates.
Accordingly I find that it has been and continues to be
Departmental policy to grant the right to release time with pay
to both Delegates and Executive Board members actively at work
at the time, to attend duly authorized Union meetings.
What is not clear and what remains in dispute is to how
many such meetings each year that right or policy applies.
contract is silent on that question.

The

The Department's position

with regard to "policy" on that point lacks uniformity; and there
is no precise or unvaried past practice.

For example^ in calendar

year 1973 Delegates were released to attend sixteen Union meetings; in 1974 Delegates were released to attend fourteen meetings;
and in 1975 Delegates were released to attend sixteen meetings,
but were denied release time with pay to attend a scheduled
seventeenth (and possibly and eighteenth) meeting.

In letters

or memoranda respectively dated October 29, November 7th and

-3December 30, 1975, Joseph A. Flynn, Fire Department Chief of
Staff stated sequentially that "the Department agreed! to excuse
for a total of twelve meetings a year"..."Delegates may be excused
for a maximum of fourteen meetings each calendar year"..."effective
January 1, 1976 excusals for Delegates...will be limited to a
maximum of six per year" (emphasis added).
In short, the practice on one hand and the Department's
position on the other are not only mutually inconsistent but both
are so varied as to negate any finding of either a binding
practice or an effective policy.
Under that circumstance it is questionable whether there
is contractual authority or authority based on practice and
policy for this Arbitrator to legislate specifically how many
meetings Delegates and, by the equal right granted them under the
Finneran letter, the Executive Board members may attend with
paid release time.

It seems to be that under those circumstances

if the question is presently a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining the parties should engage in collective bargaining on
that question.
arbitral review.

If not, a rule of reason should apply subject to
As a guideline on the matter of reasonableness

and based on the facts in this record, I deem it obviously
unreasonable for there to be no limitation on the number of meetings which Delegates and Executive Board members may attend under
the foregoing conditions.

Similarly I deem too few and hence

unreasonable, the Department's last position limiting paid attendance to only six meetings, particularly in view of what the

-4Department authorized in the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 plus
the fact that under the Union's constitution of which the
Department had actual or constructive notice, ten regular meetings are held each year.

As a practical matter and for the

future, the reasonable number of meetings which Delegates and
Executive Board members may attend in pay status may fluctuate
depending upon the prospective circumstances which legitimately
warrant or require meetings at any particular time.

For example,

more meetings in addition to regular membership meetings might
be reasonable during a year in which a new collective bargaining
agreement was negotiated, or, as the Union alleges, in 1975, to
authorize expenditure of Union pension funds to purchase Municipal
Assistance Corporation bonds.
Accordingly it is my determination and Award that if the
issue is presently a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
it is remanded to the parties for bargaining.

If not, and if

the parties cannot mutually agree upon what constitutes a
reasonable number of meetings for which Delegates and Executive
Board members would be released with pay, the Department retains
the right to determine the number of meetings, subject to the
Union's right to grieve and have reviewed in arbitration a claim
that any such quantity is not reasonable under the particular
circumstances which then obtain.

Such circumstances would in-

clude, among other relevant factors, both the needs of the Union
for those meetings, and the operational requirements of the
Department.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
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DATED: May 26, 1976
STATE OF New York .Vo o •
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this twenty sixth day of May, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-and- THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-501-75

and

The City of New York (Fire Department

The stipulated issue is:
Are Department Orders 119 Section
2.9 and 121 Section 2.6 regarding
detailing, and the implementation
thereof since July, 1975, insofar
as detailing on an inter-battalion
basis is concerned, violative of
the collective bargaining agreement?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 2, 1976.

Representatives of

the above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
The Union's complaint is that the Department has been
detailing firefighters from one battalion to another on a regular
basis since July, 1975 in violation of Article XXVII Section 2
of the collective bargaining agreement, the pertinent part of
which reads:
The Department may detail within a
battalion to fill a vacancy if another Company within that battalion
is running with an extra man
There is no dispute over the fact that the Department
has been detailing firefighters on an inter-battalion basis, as

-2well as within battalions, since the promulgation of the two
Departmental Orders referred to in the stipulated issue.
The Department has done so in order to meet the manning
requirements of the contract without paying overtime for the
retention or recall of firefighters who work other regular tours.
The Department has done so because of a reduction in the number
of firefighters available to meet the manning requirements of
the contract, following recent layoffs due to fiscal restrictions
Detailing by the Department on any broader basis than
within a battalion is violative of the colle ctive bargaining
agreement.

Article XXVII Section 2 is a negotiated restriction

on the Department's right to detail firefighters.

It allows

detailing from one Company to another within the same battalion.
But, contrary to the City's argument, by expressly authorizing
detailing within a battalion, perforce it forecloses and prohibits detailing from one battalion to another.

Article XXVII

Section 1 which reads:
The Department may equalize manpower among the Companies,
does not deal with detailing and consequently was not meant to
permit detailing on a broader basis than within a battalion.
Section 1 was bilaterally agreed to for a "one shot" realignment
or equalization of manpower by the Department at the time that
the contract was negotiated.

It was not intended nor can it

preempt the explicit provisions of Section 2 dealing with
detailing.

The right to equalize manpower among the companies,

-3at the outset of the effective period of this collective bargaining agreement, means just that, and has nothing to do with the
detailing of firefighters to meet the ongoing contractual manning
requirements.

In short, Section 1 deals with "one shot" man-

power equalization; and Section 2 deals with the subject of the
instant case.
I fully understand, and indeed can appreciate why

the

Department chose to detail on an inter-battalion basis even if
that constituted a contract breach.

The Department's budget is

critically restricted by the City's grave fiscal crisis.

It

does not have the funds to pay the overtime which would be
necessary to meet the contract manning requirements, if detailing, as the contract requires, was confined to the battalion.
The reduction in firefighting personnel, resulting from
the layoff of firemen for economic reasons, has further compounded the problem.

Fewer firefighters are now available within

each battalion to be detailed from one company to another in the
event of manning shortages.
However, unless the parties to the contract agree otherwise, or unless they negotiate new provisions or waivers of
existing provisions, the Chairman is required to enforce the
agreement as bilaterally negotiated.

Therefore I have no choice

but to direct the Department to comply with Article XXVII Section
2, and forthwith cease and desist from detailing firefighters
from one battalion to another.

Such a traditional remedy for that type of contract breach is
well established as proper and appropriate, in both the private

-6preeminent reason.
I am concerned that if the City and the Department are
ordered to pay a money remedy of this magnitude, it would result
in further reductions in firefighting facilities, thereby
further reducing the Department's capability to protect the
lives and property of the public.

With the firefighting

capability of the Department now at a precarious point, new
cuts to meet an order to pay monetary damages might further endanger the safety and well being of the public, which must rely
on the continued effectiveness of the Fire Department.

Addition

ally the imposition of a monetary penalty of this magnitude,
albeit fully justified under traditional circumstances and well
settled contract law, might well jeopardize the Department's
present plan to recall more than two hundred firefighters from
layoff.

Frankly I choose to see the Department's available

funds used not just to maintain its presently too-thin firefighting facilities but to increase and improve those facilities
and the delivery of firefighting service to the public by recalling firefighters from layoff.
To deny the firefighters and the Union monetary relief
for this year-long breach of the contract by the Department
means, in a real sense, that for a year the Department has
obtained increased productivity from the firefighter by extensive detailing beyond what is allowed under the contract,
to the tune of two million dollars.

Put another way, to deny

-7the Union and the affected firefighters monetary relief, means
that the Union and the employees have made an extensive, albeit
involuntary^ productivity contribution to the Department, the
City and to the public.
It seems to me that in current contract negotiations,
and in view of my decision not to award a monetary remedy, the
firefighters, and the Union on their behalf, who have accepted
a number of specific and workable productivity improvements
over the last few years, and who are second to none as productive
employees of this City, should be given productivity credit
for the additional savings realized from the extra-contractual
detailing between battalions in which the Department has been
engaged from July, 1975 to date.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes
the following AWARD, neither part of which may be separated from
the other:
Department Orders 119 Section 2.9
and 121 Section 2.6 regarding detailing, and the implementation
thereof since July, 1975, insofar
as detailing on an inter-battalion
basis is concerned are violative of
the collective bargaining agreement.
The contract permits detailing only
among companies within the same
battalion. Unless otherwise agreed to
by the City and the Union, the Department
is directed to forthwith cease and desist
from detailing from one battalion to
another.
As a productivity contribution by the
firefighters and the Union to the City?

-8the Department and the public, and
in the furtherance of maintaining
and improving firefighting services
to the public in the interest of the
public safety and welfare, the City
shall not be liable for monetary
damages arising from the Department's
breach of the contract for the period
July, 1975 to the date of this Award.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: June
STATE OF New York
CITY OF New York

)o o •
) ''

On this
day of June, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
OPINION AND AWARD
and
New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
whether splicers are entitled to time and
one-half for all hours worked before 4 PM
on the Saturdays in the weeks they worked
four night tours, and one Saturday tour,
between June 15, 1974 and November 22, 1974.
Hearings were held on April 12 and September 21, 1976 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The pertinent contract sections are:
Section 17.01(a): A work schedule showing
the days, scheduled tours and regular tour
assigned shall, in accordance with Section
17.02, be established for each employee for
each payroll week and become fixed at 12:00
o'clock noon, Thursday, or four (4) hours
before the end of his fourth scheduled tour,
whichever is earlier, of the payroll week
immediately preceding.
Section 17.02(3): An individual employee's
request to change his scheduled days or
tours shall be granted provided it will not
require premium payments to him or to some
other employee, and provided further, that
the employee making the request and the other
employee involved, if any, are qualified, in
the Company's judgement, to do the work on the
scheduled days or tours involved.

The

-3including the split shift, falls more properly under the provisions of Section 17.02(3) than within Section 19.08 of the
collective agreement.
The original work schedule of the affected employees required periodic rotation between weeks of day shifts and weeks
of night shifts.

Some employees, for whom the rotation was

burdensome arranged "swaps", thereby confining their work week
either to days or nights.
Company.

These "swaps" were approved by the

Thereafter, all the affected employees asked the Company

for a work schedule which would eliminate the rotation, and under
which they would work either the day shift or the night shift.
The Company agreed to this request, but a day shift on Saturday
was necessary, primarily to cover emergencies, and because of the
apparent insistence of the remaining day tour employees who woulc
have had to work every fourth rather than fifth Saturday, the
Company conditioned the approval of the request on the requirement that the employees assigned permanently to the night shift
work one Saturday day shift every five weeks.

(As the stipulatec

issue indicates, when they worked a Saturday tour each fifth
week, they worked only four night tours during the same week.)
The employees agreed to that condition.
Under the foregoing facts I am persuaded that the revised
work schedule, about which the Union complains in this case, was
effectuated only because the employees requested to work either
days or nights.

It is clear that the Company was satisfied with

the rotation schedule it had originally promulgated.

It agreed

to the subsequent change not only to accommodate the employees

-4but also because of the mandated provisions of Section 17.02(3)
of the contract.

I find the condition which the Company attached

to granting the request, namely that the night shift employees
work a Saturday day shift every fifth week,to be merely incidental to the request for a change in the work schedule
initiated by the employees and came about because the employees
to be assigned to the day shift
to cover the Saturday tours.

objected to being the only ones

Understandably they wanted the

employees who worked nights to share in the Saturday schedule.
But, had the affected employees not requested a new work schedule
which eliminated periodic rotation between days and nights, the
ultimate work schedule challenged herein with the Saturday
coverage would not have been promulgated.
what happened was substantially

On balance therefore,

in compliance with Section

17.02(3) rather than in violation of Section 19.08.

The mere

fact that the Company required Saturday coverage every fifth
week as part of an otherwise major change in the schedule requested by the employees, does not qualify this situation as a
"change (in a) scheduled tour after it had been fixed in
accordance with the provisions of Section 17.01(a),
requested by the Company", within the meaning of Section 19.08.
It was the view of a Union official that Section 17.02(3)
prohibited the Company from granting an employee's request for
a change of scheduled work day or tour after Thursday noon for
the ensuing week unless the Company granted premium pay to that

-5employee called for under any other Section of the contract.
read the clause differently.

I

Although an employee's schedule

may be posted for many months in advance of the time it becomes
fixed for the ensuing week, an affirmative obligation on the
Company to honor an employee's request for a change is plainly
stated in Section 17.02(3), irrespective of the time that the
schedule becomes fixed.

Once the schedule is fixed, the

Company is restricted from initiating a change itself unless
the affected employee consents to the change and the Company
pays premium payments required by Section 19.08(3).

But where

the scheduled change is requested by an employee, the Company
must honor that request "provided it will not require premium
payments to him or some other employee."

Therefore, where the

change is requested or initiated by the employee the Company
is not obligated to premium pay, but rather must grant that
request where premium payments to that employee or to some other
employee are not required.

To allow the Company to accede

to requests made after the schedule has become fixed only upon
payment of the same premium pay that would be required if the
Company initiated the request, would serve to defeat the reques
because it would plainly result in Company denials of all such
requests made after the schedules became fixed. Such result
would frustrate the legitimate requests of the employees,
would be deterimental to their interest, while of no particular
significance to the Company.

As I see it, it would be a

•6diminution in the rights sought and obtained by the Union in
gaining that clause.
This conclusion is further confirmed by Company Exhibit
No. 2, a joint CWA-New York Telephone Company stipulation in a
case before Arbitrator Emmanuel Stein in which several examples
were cited of changes of schedule made at the request of the
employee after the time at which the schedule became fixed.
The Company paid five days pay at straight time for the work
week involved, in the same manner as though the the employee
scheduled days had not been changed.
Finally, the Union seriously questioned the propriety of
split shifts on a pre-planned, long term basis.

The instant

work schedule may have been the first such arrangement.
not reach that question in this case.

I do

Having found that the

Company was required to grant the request of the employees
under Section 17.02(3) of the contract, I consider it at least
inequitable if not contractually

unsound, for the employees

to gain an economic benefit from part of an arrangement which
came about solely because they sought to eliminate rotating
between the day shift and the night shift, and which they
expressly agreed to in order to gain that objective.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

-7Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
the splicers are not entitled to time and
one-half for all hours worked before 4 PM
on the Saturdays in the weeks they worked
four night tours and one Saturday day tour,
between June 15, 1974 and November 22, 1974.
The Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) S " "
On this
day of October, 1976 before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
The Flight Attendants As Represented
by The Air Line Pilots Association,
International

AWARD OF SYSTEM BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT
Case No. NY-10-74S

and
Overseas National Airways, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as Chairman and members
of System Board of Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Union's grievance that Flight Attendants
be paid at the overtime rate for work performed or credited under Section 6(E) of the contract in the circumstances set forth in this
proceeding, is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Brita Garrett
Concurring

Winston Defieux
Concurring

Clare Gretz
Dissenting

Thila Gerber
Dissenting

DATED: August 8, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ° " "
On this eighth day of August, 1976, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
The Flight Attendants As Represented
by The Air Line Pilots Association,
International

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
ALPA Case #NY-10-74S

and
Overseas National Airways, Inc.

In accordance with Section 27 of the collective bargaining
agreement between the above named Union and Company dated April
1, 1972 to August 31, 1974, the Undersigned was selected as the
neutral referee of a System Board of Adjustment to hear and
decide with the Union and Company designees to said Board, a
dispute under Section 6 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Ms. Clare Gretz and Thila Gerber served as the Union
designees on the Board and Ms. Brita Garrett and Mr. Winston
Defieux served as the Company designees to said Board.
A hearing was held at the Company offices on February 5,
1975, at which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was expressly waived.
hearing briefs.

The Arbitrators'

The parties subsequently filed post-

An Executive Session of the Board was waived.

The parties authroized the Undersigned as Chairman to render the
Award, to be concurred in or dissented from by the other members
of the Board.
This case involves the application and interpretation of
Section 6(E) of the collective bargaining agreement.
reads:

That Section
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(E) If a Flight Attendant is required
to perform ground service or ground cabin
service in excess of forty-five (45) minutes
after the passengers have been boarded before
block-out or forty-five minutes after blockin, the employee shall be compensated at
applicable flight pay credit for the entire
elapsed period that such services are performed.
The Union contends that after a Flight Attendant has
achieved or been credited with sixty-five (65) hours of flight
pay credit per month under Section 6(A) of the contract, work
performed in addition thereto that month under paragraph (E)
is to be compensated for at the over-time rate.

The Company

asserts that work performed under paragraph (E),

if beyond the

sixty-five (65) hours credited under Section 6(A) is to be paid
for at straight time.
The dispute narrows to the meaning and intent of the
phrase:
"....shall be compensated at the applicable
flight pay credit...." (emphasis added),
as set forth in paragraph (E).
Implicit if not explicit in the presentation of this
case was the recognition by the parties that the foregoing
disputed phrase is contractually ambiguous.

In addition to other

parts of the contract, both sides relied heavily and principally
on "past practice" to give the phrase meaning.
I agree that the bare contract language
flight pay credit," is ambiguous.

"applicable

It could mean base or straight

time pay as well as pay at the over-time rate.
Based on the entire record before me I conclude that the
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phrase is still ambiguous; neither side having satisfactorily
cleared up the ambiguity.

The reference to other contract

sections falls short of conelusiveness.

The sparse testimony

on what transpired at negotiations when Section 6(E) was agreed
to either in the current agreement or the predecessor contract,
was not sufficiently enlightning to be probative.

The "past

practice" relied on by both sides is not determinative because
it has been neither uniform nor consistent.

The Union showed

certain specific instances in which authoritative company representatives instructed that Section 6(E) payments be made at the
overtime rate.

Yet the Company showed a vast number of examples,

indeed a pattern, over the last several years where Section

6(E)

payments were made at straight time, and not protested or grieved
The burden in this type of contract interpretation is on
the grieving party, in this case the Union, to prove the
contractual basis or justification for its grievance.

The critical

evidence in this case is incomplete, offsetting, conflicting and
hence indeterminative.
burden.

Therefore the Union has not met that

Consequently, so far as the instant case is concerned,

Section 6(E) is not definitively interpreted one way or the other,
but rather left as before because the Union's case falls short
of the burden of proof required.

Accordingly the Union's

grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmerl
Chairman

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Glass Bottle Blowers Association
Local 243, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #243-76-46-21

and
Owens Illinois, Inc.

In accordance with Articles 12 and 26 of the collective
bargaining agreement effective July 16, 1974 between Glass
Bottle Blowers Association Local 243, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as "the Union," and Owens Illinois, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as "the Company", the Undersigned was selected as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Are Factors 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of
the job Lubrication Worker-Maintenance
properly evaluated? If not what should
be the points for those factors?
A hearing was held in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania on
August 5, 1976 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Union challenges the points presently accorded Factor
2, Employment Training and Experience; Factor 5, Responsibility
for Materials; Factor 6, Responsibility for Tools and Equipment;
Factor 8, Responsibility for Safety of Others; Factor 9,*Mental
Effort; and Factor 10, Physical Effort of the above mentioned job
under the Company's job evaluation plan.

-2Based on the entire record before me I conclude that the
Union has made out a case for an increase in the point evaluation
of Factor 8 (Responsibility for Safety of Others) and Factor 10
(Physical Effort), but has not done so with regard to the other
challenged factors.
Factor 8: Responsibility for Safety of Others:

The job

is presently coded at B with a numerical evaluation of .5.

The

characteristics of the job evaluated at this level are:
Ordinary care required to prevent injury
to others. Coordinates gang or crew work
where individyal acts may injure others.
Operates equipment where others are
occasionally exposed.
The Union seeks code C with a numerical classification of
1.0.

The characteristics of the job at that level are:
Considerable care required to prevent injury to others. Operates power driven
mobile equipmwnt where others are exposed,
but probability of accident is low. Handles
inflammable liquids, gases or molten glass
where safeguards minimize the probability
of fire, explosion or serious accidents.
Part of the job of Lubrication Worker-Maintenance

is to

lubricate the "crusher" which is a large ball used to crush glass
in a twelve foot deep pit.

The lubrication is performed by a

team of two Lubrication Workers.

One shuts off the operation of

the crusher while the other performs the greasing and required
lubrication.

When completed he turns the "crusher" on again.

Part of their responsibility to prevent injury to others is to
be sure that no other employee is in the pit or in the vicinity
of the ball when the Lubrication Worker first turns the machine

-3off for lubrication and then activates it again after the
lubrication is complete.

The evidence is that mechanics routine

ly go into the pit to make repairs as does the man who loads the
crusher to inspect the pit before the crusher is put to work and
that many employees work in the area.

I am persuaded that the

Lubrication Worker's responsibility in this regard is realistically concerned with the safety of other employees, when lubrication of the crusher is carried out each day.

Considering the

possibility of a serious or fatal injury because of the size
and nature of the crusher operation, I am satisfied that as to
that responsibility the Lubrication Worker must exercise
"considerable care....to prevent injury to others" rather than
"ordinary care."

Also his task in turning the crusher off for

lubrication and then on again after lubrication is completed
is more closely the "operation of power driven mobile equipment
where others are exposed but the probability of accident is low,
than an "individual act (that) may injure others."

Though the

lubrication of the crusher requires only about fifteen minutes
of time, the fact that it must be done every day under the
conditions described, better satisfies in my view, the Code C
level than Code B for purposes of point credit.

Accordingly

Factor 8 shall be increased from Code B to Code C and accorded
a numerical classification of 1.0 rather than .5.
Factor 10: Physical Effort:

The job is presently coded

B for "light physical exertion" and a numerical classification
of .5 ("continuous").

The job requirements under that code

-4level and numerical classification reads:
Light physical exertion. Uses light
hand tools and handles light material
manually. Operates controls and valves
involving moderate physical effort.
Operates truck or tractor. Sweeps, cleans
up, shovels light material, etc.
The Union seeks Code C ("moderate physical exertion")
and a point score of 1.8 ("intermittent").

The job requirements

at that level read:
Moderate physical exertion. Handles mediumweight materials. Uses a variety of medium
size hand tools for performing tradesman's
work. Climbs and works from ladder. Operates
heavy controls and valves. Uses light sledge.
The evidence indicates that employees performing the job
use, climb and work from ladders, and also occasionally use a
light sledge.

As to frequency it is undisputed that work is

performed in this classification from a fixed ladder throughout
the plant each day, that employees go up and down those ladders
regularly and that moveable ladders and hyjackers are used
occasionally.

On balance I am persuaded that that constitutes

"climbing and working from a ladder" within the meaning of
Code C.

Based on the testimony I think it reasonable to con-

clude that the use of a ladder and hyjacker, together with
routine climbing of ladders and working off some ladders takes
from five per cent to thirty-five per cent of the Lubrication
Workers time.

Therefore I am constrained to conclude, based

on the Determination of Frequency Percentage set forth in the
job evaluation plan, that employees in this classification

-5experience "moderate physical exertion" on an "intermittent
basis."

Accordingly the Code of Factor 10 shall be raised

from B to C and the point socre from .5 to 1.8.
With regard to all the other factors challenged by the
Union, the evidence adduced either failed to support the Union'
factual allegations that additional point credit or a higher
code symbol should be accorded those factors, or did not meet
the conditions or qualifications set forth in the applicable
job evaluation plan.

I see no useful purpose in reciting the

Union's contentions or the Company's defense with respect to
those factors.
Accordingly the claims of the Union with regard to
Factors 2, 5, 6 and 9 are denied.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Factors 8 and 10 of the job Lubrication
Worker-Maintenance are not properly
evaluated. As to Factor 8 the Code shall
be increased to C with a numerical classification of 1.0. With regard to Factor
10 the Code shall be increased to C with
a numerical classification of 1.8. The
Union's claim with regard to Factors 2, 5,
6 and 9 are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: September 7, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of September, 1976, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
-._„_.„_—.—.__-._ — -. — — __«. — _ _. — „ _ _ — — _ — _ _ _ — . — —. — .

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Federation of College Teachers,
Local 1460, American Federation of
Teachers
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330-1129-75

C. W. Post Center, Long Island University

In accordance with the applicable arbitration

provisions

of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
Union and University, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. What is the Arbitrator's authority
in disputes involving Article X
Paragraph b (page 15) of the collective bargaining agreement?
2. Did the University violate the contract by failing to comply with the
procedural provisions of Article X
line 5 (page 13) and lines 1 through
9 (page 14) of the collective bargaining agreement?
A hearing was held at the offices of the University on
May 19, 1976 at which time Professor Kate S. Ahmadi, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant", Joseph R. Mack, Esq. personal
attorney for the grievant, and representatives of the University
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
briefs.

witnesses.

The parties filed post-hearing

A brief by counsel for the above named Union was also
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filed with the Arbitrator as "an interested party for the
assistance of the deliberations of the Arbitrator in the above
matter."
For reasons to be indicated I will deal with the second
issue first.
I do not find that the University violated the contract
by failing to comply with the procedural provisions of Article X
line 5 on page 13 and lines 1 through 9 on page 14 of the collec
ive bargaining agreement.

As a matter of contract law, Article

X of the contract, and indeed the entire collective bargaining
agreement was not in effect at the time that the grievant was
notified of her non-reappointment.

She was given oral notifica-

tion that she would not be reappointed on February 27, 1975.
The contract was not ratified and hence not legally binding
until March 18, 1975,

While it is apparent that Article X was

agreed to in substance prior to February 27, 1975, and could
have been followed by the University had it wished to do so, it
was not binding on the University or the Union for that matter,
until the full agreement was ratified on March 18th.

The

Arbitrator's authority is not to rule on what the parties could
have done, or indeed what might have been the better labor
relations approach, but rather what the parties are obligated
to do under the terms of their agreement.

While it is also true

that the agreement once ratified on March 18th, 1975 was made
retroactive to September 1, 1974, it is well settled that certain

-3physical conditions of a retroactive agreement simply cannot
be made retroactive.

Here the requirements set forth on line

5 of page 13 and lines 1 through 9 on page 14 are "physical
matters" which could not be made retroactive or re-created on
a retroactive

basis.

The procedure followed by the University in denying the
grievant reappointment was not materially

inconsistent with

the general procedures and practices which obtained at that
time prior to the enactment and applicability of the collective
bargaining agreement, which is the first negotiated between
the parties.
Accordingly the grievant's claim with regard to the
second issue is denied.
Based on the foregoing I find it unnecessary and therefore choose not to render a "declaratory judgement" decision
on issue 1.

I leave that question for resolution to a later

date when and if there is a justiciable and arbitrable issue
arising from Article X, of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Professor Kate S.
Ahmadi is denied.

Eric/XJ. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: November ,22, 1976
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
On this twenty second day of November, 1975, before
me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 484, IUE, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. A76-1323

and
Otis Elevator Company

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Company violated Section 3 of
Article VIII, a series of side agreements and other provisions of the contract with respect to four Specifier
jobs in Yonkers? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company plant on September 1,
1976 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Union's claim in this proceeding is that a verbal side
agreement was reached between the Union and the Company regarding
the transfer of Specifier work and the transfer of certain
employees to perform that work from the Company's plant in Harrison
to its installation in Yonkers.

The Union explains that the

agreement included certain concessions by the Union at the Yonkers
location regarding the waiver of contract seniority provisions
in order to accommodate the introduction of the Harrison work
and the Harrison employees into Yonkers, the upgrading of certain
Yonkers employees to handle additional Specifier work and the
filling of certain secondary vacancies at Yonkers created by the
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the latter upgradings.
The Union asserts that the Company reneged on the agreement and seeks its enforcement and implementation by an order
from this Arbitrator.
The Company denies that any "side agreement" was reached,
and that therefore there has been no contract breach and nothing
to enforce.
I find it unnecessary to decide whether a side agreement
was reached in September or October of 1975.

Assuming arguendo

that the parties reached an enforceable understanding then, as
alleged by the Union, the record clearly discloses, and indeed
the local Union president admits, that because the Company was
"footdragging" and not implementing the agreement as expected,
he told the Company on March 4 that the "Union was backing out of
the agreement."

I conclude therefore that on March 4th, the

Union revoked the agreement, if indeed one had been previously
consummated.
The question therefore is whether the parties reestablished
the agreement, or alternatively reached an agreement, subsequent
to March 4th.

It appears that before March 4th, the Union took

certain steps which could be construed as contractual concessions
or prospectively acceptable arrangements

in anticipation of the

completion or implementation of an understanding with the Company
regarding the transfer of the Harrison work and employees and
the integration of that work and those employees into the Yonkers
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plant.

Yet the record falls short of showing that after March

4th the parties actually concluded a new agreement or reestablished
the alleged prior understanding.

It is the Union's contention

that the agreement was reestablished in discussions during the
grievance procedure.

But the evidence discloses that as late

as April 6th, at a grievance meeting that day, the parties had
still not agreed among other things, on how certain secondary
jobs were to be filled.

And the record before me contains no

additional evidence upon which I could conclude that after April
6th, and prior to the filing of the grievance, further agreements
or understandings were entered into between the parties, which,
as a totality, would constitute either a new full agreement
or the reestablishment of what the Union contends was agreed to
prior to March 4, 1976.

In short, that the Union may have taken

certain difficult steps in a good faith expectation that an
agreement would be implemented is not, standing alone,

sufficient

evidence to reestablish or prove the making of an agreement after
the Union's revocation of March 4th.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company has not violated Section 3 of
Article VIII, a series of side agreements
and other provisions of the contract with
respect to four Specifier jobs in Yonkers.
The Union's grievance is denied.

Eri/ J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-4DATED: October 25, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) b''
On this twenty-fifth day of October, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

